There is only one way to defend yourself, in the criminal process (by resisting)?
(Brief notes on the relationship between consensual criminal justice and the defendant's right of defense)
Abstract
This paper seeks to answer the following question: does the adoption of consensual criminal justice institutes imply an affront to the fundamental rights of the accused, more specifically to his right of defense? After a brief analysis of the purposes of the process, compared with the objectives that surround the regulation of consensual mechanisms in the criminal sphere, and after verifying the general requirements for the celebration of criminal agreements and the dimension of the right of defense of the accused, we conclude that the procedures deviated from the solution of the criminal case do not result, by themselves, in the degrading of the fundamental rights of the accused, nor his right of defense. In the end, we conclude that the question that motivated this work should be answered in the negative. Instead, there is an amplification of the right of defense of the accused.